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This paper analyzes how changes in the enforcement of labor regulations impact on the 
compliance rate in a context where the labor rules and the characteristics of the labor 
inspection system differ by firm size. In addition to the channels analyzed in the existing 
literature –the deterrence effect of labor inspections and the movement of displaced 
workers into the informal sector, this paper adds a margin of adjustment not analyzed 
before: firms can reduce their size to take advantage of lower penalties for violating the 
labor rules and/or less stringent regulations. I analyze empirically which forces have 
dominated for workers employed in firms of different size in Peru during 2008-2013. I 
measure the enforcement of labor regulations as the number of labor inspections per 
hundred workers at the regional level, and I instrument it using a measure of the arrival 
cost of labor inspectors to the firms. The findings reveal that the degree of enforcement 
had little impact on the compliance with labor regulations. The effect of firms reducing 
their size to enjoy lower fines and/or less stringent regulations was small in magnitude 
and the direction of the effect was not clear. The general lack of effect of the enforcement 
measure on the compliance with the labor rules indicates that the labor inspection system 
is not effective in Peru, either because it is not able to generate the incentives to comply 
with labor regulations (e.g. because of lack of resources) or because it fails to overcome 
the consequences of the adjustment process associated to an increase in the compliance 
level (e.g. displaced workers moving into the informal sector of the economy). 
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1. Introduction 
The non-compliance with labor market regulations is widespread in Peru as in many Latin 
American countries. In 2014, 54.2% of salaried workers in the private sector didn’t receive 
pension contributions, 48.8% didn’t have a labor contract, while 32.4% received a monthly 
earning below the legislated minimum wage (SEDLAC, 2016). As expected, the share of 
workers uncovered by labor benefits is larger when they are employed in firms of small size. For 
instance, 87.6% of salaried workers in private firms of 10 employees or less didn’t receive 
pension contributions in 2014 according to the national household survey, while that figure was 
48.9% for workers in firms of 11 to 100 employees.  
The government of Peru has implemented a set of policies during the 2000s with the aim of 
increasing the level of compliance with labor regulations (ILO, 2014). These measures included 
a special labor regime for small-sized firms, the Labor Regime for Micro and Small firms 
(MYPE regime), set up in 2003 and expanded in 2008.
1
 Initially, this regime reduced the 
strictness of some labor obligations for micro firms.
2
 Since 2008, it also covers small firms but 
the reduced stringency of labor regulations is usually lower for them. Thus, micro firms have less 
strict labor regulations compared to small firms in some cases, e.g. health insurance 
contributions. Other labor regulations continue being applicable to all workers regardless the size 
of the firm where they work, e.g. the minimum wage.  
The labor inspection system is other strategy used by the government of Peru to increase the 
level of compliance with the labor rules. As in other Latin American countries, inspection 
activities are focused on formal firms in Peru. Labor inspections are leaded and carried out by 
regional agencies spread throughout the country. When a labor inspector detects a violation to a 
labor market regulation, a monetary fine is proposed. In Peru, fines differ according to the 
severity of the violation and the number of workers affected. The fines also vary depending on 
the size of the firm that was detected violating the labor rules. Micro and small firms are 
benefited with a 50% reduction in the amount of the fine compared to what a large firm would 
have paid for the same violation. 
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 Other measures were the introduction of a simplified income tax system for micro firms and the implementation of 
an electronic payroll system in 2008 which replaced the previous payroll books (ILO, 2014).  
2
 According to the classification endorsed in 2008, a micro firm employs between 1 and 10 workers, while a small 
firm employs between 1 and 100. The classification also considers thresholds on the value of annual sales. Any 
other firm is considered a large firm. See Section 3 for more details. 
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In this paper I explore microdata from Peruvian household surveys for the period 2008-2013 
to analyze how changes in the enforcement of labor regulations affect the compliance rate at the 
regional level in a context where the labor rules and the characteristics of the labor inspection 
system differ according to firm size. I expect the usual forces analyzed by other papers to be at 
play here –the deterrence effect of labor inspections and the movement of workers to the 
informal sector of the economy where firms are not inspected (Ronconi, 2010; Bhorat et al. 
2012; Almeida and Carneiro, 2012; Almeida et al., 2013). However, the design of labor market 
regulations in Peru jointly to a scheme of penalties for violations to the labor rules that depends 
on the size of the firms add a margin of adjustment not analyzed before. When the degree of 
enforcement increases, large firms may choose to cross the size threshold to become small and 
enjoy lower fines and/or less rigid labor regulations. Small firms may become micro in order to 
face more flexible labor regulations and equal fines. I intend to identify empirically which forces 
have dominated for micro, small and large firms in Peru during 2008-2013 and to disentangle 
some of them.  
In absence of firm level data, I use information from the Peruvian household survey 
(ENAHO) where workers report their own working conditions and the size of the firm where 
they are employed. I restrict the analysis to the period 2008 (a new definition of small firms was 
implemented that year) to 2013 (a new change in the classification of firms and some changes to 
the labor inspection system were introduced in 2014). Information on labor benefits includes 
enrolment into the pension system and having a labor contract. The surveys also collect 
information on the number of hours of work during the last week and labor earnings that I 
compare with the legislated maximum of weekly hours of work and with the minimum wage 
respectively. The sample comprises wage employees from the private sector aged 15 to 65 (the 
legislated retirement age) and excludes workers from the primary sector, domestic workers, and 
workers with apprenticeship contracts all of whom have labor regimes different from the MYPE 
regime and the General Labor Regime –the regime applicable to firms of large size.3 I measure 
the regional degree of enforcement as the annual number of inspection per hundred salaried 
workers in the private sector. There is no information regarding differences in the inspection 
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 The labor regime for domestic workers is established in the Ley de Trabajadores del Hogar (Law 27986). Workers 
from the agricultural and livestock sectors have a labor regime ruled by the Ley de Promoción Agraria (Law 27360), 
while workers from the mining sector have some sector-specific regulations, such as the minimum wage for mining 
workers. Workers with apprenticeship contracts are also subject to special regulations, such as the maximum weekly 
hours of work. 
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intensity by size of the firm. The only reference about this point is an annual inspection target of 
20% of micro firms established by law. 
The identification of the effect of the degree of regional enforcement on the compliance with 
labor regulations requires dealing with the possible impact of the compliance rate on the degree 
of enforcement (reverse causality problem) and the correlation of the enforcement measure with 
unobserved institutional and development time-varying characteristics at the regional level 
(omitted variables problem). I propose to use an instrumental variable strategy. The proposed 
instrument is a measure of the arrival cost of labor inspectors to the firms. Labor inspectors 
travel by car or using public transportation from the local inspection agencies to the firms to be 
inspected. The extension of the road network and the traffic in each region provides a measure of 
the arrival cost to the firms. The arrival cost is defined as the logarithm of the number of per 
capita crossing vehicles per kilometer of regional roads. First stage results show that the measure 
of arrival cost is a strong predictor of the regional enforcement level.  
Results reveal that the regional degree of enforcement affected the compliance with only few 
of the labor regulations analyzed. The estimated impacts differ depending on the size of the firms 
where workers are employed and on the geographic area. An increase in the number of 
inspections per hundred workers leads to an increase in the shares of workers earning the 
minimum wage in small and large firms, and to an increase in the share of workers in micro 
firms having a labor contract, although this last result is statistically weak. When the sample is 
restricted to the urban area, an increase in the degree of enforcement generates a reduction in the 
shares of workers enrolled into the pension system in small and large firms, indicating different 
adjustment patterns in urban and rural areas. No effect was found for the compliance with the 
maximum hours of work regardless the size of the firm where workers are employed. The 
findings also show that the effect generated by firms crossing the size thresholds to enjoy lower 
monetary fines and/or more flexible regulations is small in magnitude and it is not clear in which 
direction operates –it increases the compliance in some cases and it reduces it in some others.  
The general lack of effect of the enforcement measure on the compliance with the labor rules 
leads to the conclusion that the labor inspection system is not effective in Peru, either because it 
is not able to generate the incentives to comply with labor regulations (e.g. because resources are 
scarce, fines are too low, and/or labor inspectors turn a blind eye on violations to the rules) or 
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because it fails to overcome the consequences of the adjustment process associated to an increase 
in the compliance level (e.g. displaced workers moving to the informal sector of the economy). 
This paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the relationship between enforcement of 
labor market regulations and labor market outcomes. The large non-compliance level with the 
labor law especially in developing countries, has led to the emergence of studies emphasizing the 
importance of enforcement of labor regulation. Among the studies analyzing country-specific 
experiences, the evidence indicates that higher enforcement of the labor law increases the 
compliance with labor market regulations (Ronconi, 2010; Almeida and Carneiro, 2012; 
Almeida et al., 2013) or does not generate any effect (Bhorat et al., 2012), increases the 
compliance among men and reduces the compliance among women (Viollaz, 2016), reduces 
firms’ size and possibly productivity (Almeida and Carneiro, 2009), decreases job creation and 
increases job destruction (Almeida and Poole, 2013), reduces de provision of non-mandated 
benefits (Almeida et al., 2013), and generates wage adjustments -mainly reductions of formal 
wages at the top of the wage distribution and increases of informal wages (Almeida and 
Carneiro, 2012; Almeida et al., 2013). Regarding the effect of the degree of enforcement on the 
level of compliance, the channels analyzed by this literature have been the deterrence effect of 
labor inspections and the movement of displaced workers to the informal sector of the economy. 
This paper brings into consideration, to my knowledge for the first time, an additional margin of 
adjustment which is the downsizing of firms in order to take advantage of less stringent labor 
regulations and/or lower penalties for violating the labor rules.
4
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section (Section 2) provides a description of 
labor market regulations in Peru and statistics on the compliance level. Section 3 describes the 
labor inspection system and proposed an enforcement measure to be used in the empirical 
analysis. Section 4 discusses theoretically the expected effects of a change in the degree of 
enforcement on the compliance with labor rules in Peru. Sections 5 and 6 present the empirical 
strategy and the results obtained, while Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Size based labor regulations and compliance in Peru 
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 There is an extensive literature on the effect of size dependent policies on firm behavior, such as tax evasion (for 
instance, Kanbur and Keen, 2014) and incentives to remain inefficiently small (for instance, Garicano et al., 2013). 
However, this topic has not been considered by the literature analyzing the relationship between enforcement of 
labor market regulations and the level compliance.   
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2.1 Labor market regulations  
In Peru, workers’ rights are established in the Political Constitution and protected by the labor 
inspection system led by the Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del Empleo (Labor Ministry or 
MTPE). Wage employees are entitled to several benefits. Some of these benefits differ according 
to the size of the firm, being less generous for workers in firms of smaller size. 
Firms in Peru are classified into micro, small and large according to the number of 
employees and the value of annual sales. This classification was established with the purpose of 
implementing development and formalization policies for micro and small firms. The first 
classification was endorsed by the Ley de Promoción y Formalización de la Micro y Pequeña 
Empresa (Law 28015) passed on 2003. A Legislative Order in 2008 (Legislative Order 1086) 
changed the classification and that one prevailed until 2013.
5
 According to this classification, a 
micro firm employs between 1 and 10 workers and its annual sales are equal or below 150 tax 
units.
6
 A small firm employs between 1 and 100 workers and the annual sales are between 151 
and 1700 tax units. Any other firm is considered medium or large. I will refer to these firms as 
large firms in this paper. 
Special labor benefits for workers in micro firms –lower benefits compared to workers in 
other firms- were first established in the MYPE regime set up in 2003 (Law 28015). Some 
modifications to the MYPE regime were introduced in 2008 (Legislative Order 1086). First, the 
degree of stringency of labor regulations -or conversely, the generosity of labor benefits- was 
reduced even more for micro firms. Second, small firms were included in the regime with a 
degree of stringency of labor rules in between the degree for micro and large firms. Labor 
relationships in large firms continue being regulated by the General Labor Regime.  
The main differences in labor benefits for workers in micro and small firms compared to 
workers in large firms are as follows. Vacation time and family allowances are equal for workers 
in micro and small firms and smaller than the benefit for workers in large firms. The surcharge 
for night shifts is larger for workers in small and large firms compared to workers in micro firms. 
The contributions to the health insurance system are paid entirely by the employer for workers in 
large and small firms (ESSALUD system), while the state pays half of the contribution for 
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 The Law 30056 that was passed on 2013 and came into force in 2014 classifies firms according to the annual value 
of sales only. 
6
 The tax units are units of reference used for tax purposes. For instance, the tax unit was set at 3450 nuevos soles 
(1158 USD) in December 2007 and it was 3700 nuevos soles in December 2013 (1329 USD). 
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workers in micro firms (SIS system). Regarding the contributions to the pension system, they are 
completely paid by workers in Peru while employers have the obligation of enrolling employees 
into the system and deducting the contributions from the monthly wage. The 2008 reform 
established they are mandated for workers in all firms, but workers in micro firms can choose to 
contribute to the Sistema de Pensiones Sociales (SPS) in which case, the state pays half of the 
contribution. The SPS, however, has not started to operate. Thus, between 2008 and 2013, the 
previous rule was applied meaning that the enrolment into the pension system was voluntary for 
workers in micro firms. Finally, the compensation for length of service, the annual reward and 
the severance pay are lower for workers in micro firms compared to workers in small and large 
firms, and these benefits are also lower for workers in small firms in comparison to workers in 
large firms. 
Other workers’ rights established in the General Labor Regime apply to all workers 
regardless the size of the firm. They include: a monthly wage equal or above the minimum wage; 
a maximum of 8 working hours a day and 48 hours a week; a break of no less than 45 minutes a 
day; a minimum of 24 hours of rest time during the week; a paid maternity leave of 90 days and 
a paternity leave of four days. All labor relationships must be established through a written 
contract (Ley de Productividad y Competitividad Laboral, Law 728). 
 
2.2 Compliance with labor market regulations  
Compliance with labor market regulations is low in Peru. The Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 
(ENAHO) contains data on pension contributions, monthly earnings, hours of work, and labor 
contracts. All the information is reported by workers. With this information it is possible to 
construct binary variables indicating if a wage employee is enrolled in the pension system, if 
he/she earns a monthly wage equal or above the minimum, if he/she works no more than the 
legal maximum of weekly hours, and if he/she has a labor contract.
7
  
The sample of workers from the private sector aged 15 to 65 (excluding workers from the 
primary sector, domestic workers, and workers with apprenticeship contracts) comprised 47.8% 
of wage employees on average during 2008-2013. Only 44.0% of them were enrolled into the 
pension system, 66.0% earned a monthly labor income in the main occupation equal or above the 
                                                          
7
 In Peru, the minimum wage for employees working less than 4 hours a day is proportional to the number of hours 
worked (Ministerial Resolution 091-92). That adjustment was included in the calculation of the compliance rate. I 
considered the number of weekly hours of work in the main occupation only. 
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minimum wage, 60.8% worked no more than legal maximum of weekly hours, and only 43.5% 
had a written labor contract (Figure 1). 
Among wage employees, 49.3% were employed in micro firms (between 1 and 10 
employees) during 2008-2013, while the figures for small (between 11 and 100 workers) and 
large firms were 28.0% and 22.7%.
8
 The pattern of compliance with labor market regulations by 
firm size indicates that the share of workers covered by these regulations tends to be larger the 
larger the size of the firm (Figure 1). The percentage of labor relationships governed by a labor 
contract –a regulation that applies equally to all firms- was approximately 7 times larger for 
workers employed in large firms compared to micro firms. The ratio was around 4.5 for the 
percentage of workers enrolled into the pension system. The gap in this case is in keeping with 
the voluntary nature of the pension contributions for workers in micro firms during the analyzed 
period. The percentage of workers earning the minimum wage or above –a regulation that 
applies equally to all firms- was almost twice as large in large firms compared to micro firms. 
Finally, the increasing pattern of compliance by size of the firm is not present for the maximum 
hour of work per week –another regulation with no difference by firm size. The share of salaried 
workers covered by this regulation was very similar in the three groups of firms, and it was 
slightly larger in micro and small firms compared to large firms. 
The pattern of compliance with labor market regulations also differs by region (Figure 2). 
The average percentage of workers enrolled into the pension system during 2008-2013 ranged 
from a minimum of 11.2% in Apurimac to 62.3% in Ica. There is also a large heterogeneity in 
the coverage of the minimum wage legislation by region. Apurimac was also the region with the 
lowest percentage of workers earning the minimum wage or more (37.1%), while Lima had the 
highest rate of coverage (76.1%). The average percentage of workers with a labor contract was 
only 14.3% in Apurimac -minimum value-, while the maximum was 58.4% in Callao. Finally, 
the average compliance with the legal maximum of weekly hours of work was larger compared 
to the other labor regulations. In Loreto, the region with the minimum rate of compliance, 52.6% 
of salaried workers worked no more than the legal maximum of weekly hours, while in 
Cajamarca the compliance reached 71.5% (the highest rate).  
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 I classified firms into micro, small and large using the criterion of number of employees and information of the 
size of the firm where workers are employed, as data on the value of annual sales is not available.  
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Calculations on the intensity of compliance with labor regulations indicate that the average 
percentage of workers in the sample that enjoyed the four labor benefits covered by the ENAHO 
was only 17.8% over the period (Figure 3). The percentage covered by at least one of them was 
92.4%, while the percentage with none of them reached 15.0%. The percentages of workers 
receiving all labor benefits and receiving at least one of them increase with the size of the firm. 
The opposite occurs with the percentage who does not receive any labor benefits.  
The large percentage of workers receiving some of the benefits but not all of them reveals 
that firms do not restrict their choices to complying with all the regulations or not complying 
with any of them. One possible interpretation is that firms choose the regulations they violate 
depending on the saving of labor costs and on the expected fine. The data analyzed so far shows 
that the non-compliance is larger for the enrolment into the pension system and the labor contract 
which are “serious” violations and penalized with a lower fine than the non-compliance with the 
minimum wage and the maximum hours of work which are “very serious” violations in the 
Peruvian system.
9
 
 
3. The labor inspection system in Peru 
3.1 How the labor inspection system works? 
The labor inspection system in Peru is a public service set up to monitor the compliance with 
labor market and social security regulations in the private sector, give guidance and technical 
advice on labor matters, and penalized the violations to the rules. 
 The structure of the system follows the recommendations of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO Agreement 81). There is a central authority, the Dirección Nacional de 
Inspección del Trabajo (National Labor Inspection Office or DNIT) which is part of the MTPE 
and was created through the Ley General de Inspección del Trabajo passed on 2006 (Law 
28806). Its role is to promote the cooperation between all the inspection agencies in the country 
and between labor inspectors on the one hand, and employers and workers on the other hand. 
Each of the 25 regions in Peru has one Inspección Regional de Trabajo in its jurisdiction 
(regional inspection agency of high rank) and some of them have Inspecciones Zonales de 
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 Next section provides details on the labor inspection system in Peru and on the fines applied. 
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Trabajo (regional inspection agencies of low rank).
10
 The labor inspection functions of the 
regional agencies extend to each region’s territory.11 
 Every year, the DNIT prepares the national annual plan of labor inspections in coordination 
with regional governments. Then, each regional government leads and carries out the labor 
inspections in its territory, as it states in the Ley Orgánica de Gobiernos Regional (Law 27867). 
The electronic payroll system implemented in place of the old payroll books in 2008, allowed to 
extend the reach of the MTPE, easing the planning of the inspection functions (Rani, et al., 2013; 
Díaz, 2014b; ILO, 2015).
12
 Between 2008 and 2011, the annual plan of labor inspections was 
under the Plan RETO, a national program aimed to increase the registration of employees in the 
electronic payroll system. However, the guidelines of the program were not different to the 
criteria established in the Ley General de Inspección del Trabajo.  
 Labor inspections are focused on formal firms – those enrolled in the tax register (Registro 
Único de Contribuyentes or RUC in Peru). Informal firms are subject to guidance and orientation 
interventions regarding labor market regulations. There is no indication about differences in the 
inspection intensity by size of the firm. Theoretically, large firms are expected to face a higher 
probability of being detected violating the labor law (Levy, 2008). The only reference regarding 
this point in Peru is in the Ley de Promoción y Formalización de la Micro y Pequeña Empresa 
(Law 28015) which established an annual inspection target of 20% of micro firms. 
 Labor inspections are carried out in urban areas mainly. The rural sector has received labor 
inspections, but they are not usually part of the annual inspection plan (Díaz, 2014a; Díaz, 
2014b). The reason is the scarcity of resources. As was documented for other Latin American 
countries, the labor inspection system in Peru has very few labor inspectors for the size of its 
working population (Weil, 2008). For instance, in 2009 the system had only 406 labor inspectors 
in the whole country, only 6 of the 25 regions had a supervisor, and most labor inspectors were 
                                                          
10
 The region of Junin has 5 regional agencies, Arequipa, Ica, Piura and San Martin have 4 regional agencies, Cusco, 
La Libertad, Lima, Moquegua and Ucayali have 3 regional agencies, Amazonas, Ancash, Apurimac, Cajamarca, 
Loreto, Madre de Dios, Puno and Tacna have 2 regional agencies, while Ayacucho, Callao, Huancavelica, Huanuco, 
Lambayeque, Pasco and Tumbes have one regional agency. The number of regional agencies did not change during 
the period covered in this study. 
11
 There is only one exception to the regional boundaries of labor inspection activities. The DNIT can assign a 
regional inspection agency to perform labor inspections in a different region when a firm to be inspected carries out 
its activities in more than one region.   
12
 The electronic payroll system in place between 2008 and 2010 was due to employers with more than 3 employees 
(Decreto Supremo 018-2007). In 2011, some clarifications were introduced to the legislation regarding the 
electronic payroll system (Decreto Supremo 015-2010 and 008-2011). With these modifications, all employers have 
the obligation to present electronically the information about employees, remuneration, and contributions.  
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concentrated in the regions of Lima and Callao (Díaz, 2014; Julca Babarzy, 2013; Requejo 
Alemán, 2013). According to the Ley General de Inspección del Trabajo (Law 28806), the 
MTPE jointly to the regional governments should guarantee the availability of human resources 
and equipment to carry out the inspections. In case the means of transport to arrive to the firms to 
be inspected are lacking, the MTPE and regional governments should refund the transport 
expenses. However, in most regional agencies the transport expenses are covered long after the 
labor inspections are carried out, and in some of them they are never reimbursed (Requejo 
Alemán, 2013).  
 Labor inspectors target different types of violations. “Minor” violations include violations to 
documentary requirements mostly, such as the lack of delivery of the labor contract or pay stub 
to workers. “Serious” violations include the lack of essential data of labor contracts in the 
employees’ register that firms keep, violation of regulations regarding the amount, place and 
time of payment of remuneration and labor benefits including contributions to the health 
insurance and pension system, lack of labor contract or the unilateral modification of the contract 
by the employer. “Very serious” violations include among others, the non-compliance with the 
minimum wage legislation, violation of regulations regarding the extension of working days, 
holidays and leaves, violation of norms related to child labor, any discriminatory behavior of the 
employer, and actions affecting the workers’ dignity. 
When labor inspection activities finish, the labor inspector prepares a report about the results. 
If a situation of non-compliance with the law is detected, the employer receives a proposal to 
solve the irregularity in certain period of time in exchange for a reduction in the penalty.
13
 The 
amount of the fine depends on the severity of the irregularity detected and on the number of 
workers affected by the violation. Between 2008 and 2013, the penalization ranged between 1 
and 5 tax units for a minor violation, between 6 and 10 tax units for a serious violation, and 
between 11 and 20 tax units for a very serious violation. The firm pays a percentage of that 
amount depending on the number of workers affected by the violation, being the percentage 
higher the larger the number of workers affected. The total value of the monetary penalization 
cannot exceed 30 tax units, and micro and small firms are benefited by a 50% discount on the 
amount of the fine.  
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 If the situation of the non-compliance persists, the amount of the fine increases depending of the severity of the 
violation.  
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Important changes were introduced to the labor inspection system in 2013. The Law 29981 
created the Superintendencia Nacional de Fiscalización Laboral (SUNAFIL) to be the central 
authority of the system and applied new rules to the distribution of labor inspection functions. 
The SUNAFIL started operating in April 2014. Under the new structure, the system is mainly 
centralized on the SUNAFIL which has the role of perform labor inspections on large and small 
firms, while the regional inspection agencies have the role to inspect micro firms.  
 
3.2 Enforcement of labor market regulations 
The measure of enforcement of labor market regulations is the number of labor inspections per 
hundred salaried workers employed in the private sector in each region and year, excluding 
workers from the primary sector, domestic workers and workers with apprenticeship contracts.  
 Enforcement is expected to vary at the regional level for at least two reasons. First, as 
pointed out in the previous sub-section, labor inspection resources (labor inspectors and means of 
transportation) differ across regions. Second, labor inspections were leaded and carried out by 
the regional agencies with jurisdiction in each region during the period analyzed. That means 
that regional agencies had the space to pursue different objectives, e.g. maximize the compliance 
level or preserve employment opportunities when regional economic conditions are bad and 
unemployment high. Moreover, the Peruvian labor inspection system follows the Latin approach 
where inspection responsibilities are highly decentralized (Piore and Schrank, 2008). Inspectors 
have enormous discretion and flexibility in carrying out their activities, leading possibly to 
different enforcement efforts across regions and even to corruption practices. Regarding the last 
point, the low level of remuneration received by labor inspectors in Peru has been pointed out as 
a high risk of corruption (Requejo Aleman, 2013). 
Figure 4 reports the time series of some variables related to the inspection system between 
2008 and 2013. Panels (a) and (b) show for the country as a whole, the number of inspections 
and the number of inspections per hundred salaried workers. Both variables present a similar 
pattern over time, with an initial increase and a subsequent reduction. The total number of 
inspections was 60 thousand a year on average, while the number of inspections as a percentage 
of salaried workers was around 1.4. The lower two panels show the evolution of variables related 
to the results of labor inspections. The number of violations to labor market regulations detected 
by labor inspectors is presented in Panel (c). After a year of no improvements in the detection of 
12 
 
labor infractions at the beginning of the period analyzed, the number of violations discovered 
and reported increased between 2009 and 2010. The detection standstill between 2008 and 2009 
may be related to the international crisis as labor inspectors may have turned a blind eye to 
protect businesses. Between 2010 and 2013, the number of violations detected increased slightly 
despite the reduction in the number of inspections. Panel (d) shows the total value of the fines 
applied (although not necessarily collected). The monetary value of the penalizations moved 
erratically over the period, and it did not follow the trend of the number of violations detected in 
some of the years. That could be explained by the characteristics of the fines scheme, which 
depends on the severity of the violation and on the number of workers affected. 
Figure 5 presents the variation in the measure of enforcement across regions and over time. 
More specifically, the figure shows the annual change in the number of inspections per hundred 
salaried workers for each of the 25 region and some consecutive years. Between 2008 and 2009, 
the degree of enforcement increased in most regions. The average change in the enforcement 
measure was 0.45 inspections per hundred salaried workers, ranging from a minimum of -0.29 
(Apurimac) to a maximum of 1.80 (Pasco). Changes tended to be larger for regions with higher 
levels of enforcement in 2008, indicating a change in the structure of the enforcement degree 
across regions.
14
 Between 2010 and 2011, the enforcement decreased in most regions. In this 
case, regions with larger levels of enforcement in 2010 tended to exhibit the largest reductions.
15
 
For the period 2013-2012, the average change in the enforcement measure was again negative 
and ranged from a minimum of -0.48 (Apurimac) to a maximum of 0.80 (Ucayali). 
 
4. Theoretical channels 
The labor inspection system has the role of protecting workers’ rights. When the enforcement of 
labor market regulations increases, for instance through a rise in the number of inspections, an 
increase in the level of compliance is expected. The increased compliance is explained by the 
perception of a higher probability of being inspected and fined (deterrence effect).  
The rise in labor costs for firms that increased their compliance level can lead them to reduce 
the size of their labor force, among other margins of adjustment (Micco and Pages, 2006; Ahmad 
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 The average change in the enforcement measure for the 12 regions with lower level of enforcement in 2008 was 
0.41 inspections per hundred workers, while the average change for the regions above the median value of 2008 was 
0.50. 
15
 The average reduction in the enforcement measure for the regions below the median value of 2010 was 0.04 
inspections per hundred workers, while the average reduction for the regions above the median of 2010 was 0.29. 
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and Pages, 2007; Amin, 2008; Almeida and Carneiro, 2009).
16
 A possible associated effect is 
that workers who lose their jobs may offer their hours of work in the informal sector depending 
on workers’ valuation of the mandated benefits being enforced (Almeida and Carneiro, 2012; 
Almeida et al., 2013). That effect is possible because labor inspections are focused on formal 
firms in Peru. Thus, an increase in the enforcement effort may lead to a growth in the share of 
workers not covered by labor benefits (movement into the informal sector effect). 
The different degrees of stringency of labor market regulations according to firm size in 
Peru, i.e. regulations are less strict the smaller the size of the firm, and the heterogeneities in the 
characteristics of the labor inspection system according to firm size, i.e. fines are lower for micro 
and small firms, create other margin of adjustment. More specifically, firms can decide to cross 
the size thresholds in order to enjoy lower fines and/or less stringent labor regulations (size 
thresholds effect). I differentiate three regimes depending on the severity of regulations and fines 
that firms face. First, there is the regime of “same labor market regulations and different fines”. 
That is the case of labor benefits entitled to all workers regardless the size of the firm, such as the 
minimum wage, which violation leads to fines twice as large for large firms compared to micro 
and small firms (for a given number of workers affected by the violation). Second, there is the 
regime of “different labor market regulations and equal fines”. That is the case of some labor 
benefits which differ between micro and small firms, such as the enrollment of workers into the 
pension system, which violation is equally penalized by the labor inspection system (for a given 
number of workers affected by the violation). Finally, the regime of “different labor market 
regulations and different fines” refers to those regulations with different degrees of stringency 
between micro/small firms and large firms, such as paid vacation time, which are penalized 
harder in absolute terms when the offender firms is large.  
Under the regime of “same labor market regulations and different fines” an increase in the 
enforcement level can lead large firms which are not complying with some labor rule/s to 
become small in order to be penalized with a lower fine in case of being detected by a labor 
inspector.
17
 This decision will depend on the evaluation of the change in the cost and benefit of 
evading the regulations and the change in revenues due to a small number of workers. The 
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 For instance, firms can adjust the level of investment (Besley and Burgess, 2004; Scarpetta and Tressel, 2004; 
Autor, Kerr and Kugler, 2007), hourly wages (Almeida and Carneiro, 2012), non-mandated benefits or hours of 
work (Almeida, Carneiro and Narita, 2013). 
17
 I am assuming that a large firm that was complying with all the labor rules before the increase in the degree of 
enforcement does not change its behavior and continues with perfect compliance. 
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benefit of not complying with the labor rules will be the same in a per worker basis under this 
regime, but the cost will be smaller because small firms pay lower fines compared to large firms. 
For those firms that decide to cross the size threshold, the reduction in the number of employees 
could take place through the dismissal of workers or through the substitution of formal workers 
with informal workers, as the number of employees considered to become part of the MYPE 
regime is the staff enrolled in the electronic payroll system. Thus, an increase in the enforcement 
level may result in a reduction in the average compliance level for firms of small size and an 
increase for large firms, ceteris paribus.  
An increase in the enforcement effort under the regime “different labor market regulations 
and equal fines” can generate incentives for small firms which are violating some labor rule/s to 
become micro in order to enjoy more flexible regulations. For these firms, the cost of being 
detected by a labor inspector continue being the same under this regime (micro and small firms 
are equally penalized for the same violation), but the benefits are smaller due to the less stringent 
regulations for micro compared to small firms. For those firms that decide to cross the size 
threshold and become micro, the adjustment may involve the dismissal of workers or the 
substitution of formal with informal workers. Overall, under this regime an increase in the 
average compliance with labor regulations for small firms is possible, while the average 
compliance level may increase or fall for micro firms, ceteris paribus.  
Finally, under the regime “different labor market regulations and different fines” an increase 
in the enforcement level generates incentives in opposite directions. On the one hand, large firms 
can benefit from lower fines if they become small, increasing the incentives to keep violating 
labor regulations. On the other hand, these regulations are more flexible for micro and small 
firms under this regime, implying that the compliance will be cheaper if a large firm becomes 
small. 
The three regimes described so far are not mutually exclusive, meaning that firms make 
decisions considering all the incentives arising from a change in the degree of enforcement given 
their size before the change. All in all, the design of labor market regulations jointly to the 
heterogenous penalization policy by firm size and the focus of labor inspections on formal firms 
generate incentives to the compliance with labor rules which go in opposite directions and differ 
by firm size. The combination of the different forces at work may end up offsetting the intended 
15 
 
effect of labor rules and the labor inspection system: to increase the share of workers covered by 
labor benefits.  
 
5. Empirical model 
In this section I detail the econometric strategy to analyze the relationship between enforcement 
of labor market regulations and compliance in the Peruvian labor market differentiating by firm 
size.  
The main specification regresses indicator variables for compliance with the enrollment into 
the pension system, with the minimum wage, with the maximum weekly hours of work, and with 
a written labor contact (one at a time) for individual i, in region r and year t (     in equation (1) 
below) on the measure of enforcement for region r and year t, which is defined as the logarithm 
of the number of inspections per hundred salaried workers (    in equation (1)) and its 
interaction with indicator variables for the size of the firm where worker i is employed (    
  in 
equation (1), s=micro, small, large). The sample includes wage employees from the private 
sector aged 15 to 65 (the legislated retirement age), excluding workers from the primary sector, 
domestic workers, and workers with apprenticeship contracts. Firms are classified into micro, 
small and large using the criterion of the number of employees, but not the thresholds of annual 
sales as that information is not available in the household surveys. 
The model also controls for a set of individual characteristics (     in equation (1)) (gender, 
age and age squared, indicator variables for the educational level, an indicator variable of civil 
status, the number of children under 14 years of age at home, race and urban area indicators, and 
economic sector indicator variables), and several variables at the region level with variation over 
time (    in equation (1)). These regional variables are included to control for characteristics 
that can be correlated with the level of enforcement and can affect the level of compliance as 
well, like the regional business and political cycle and the development level (Piore and Schrank, 
2008; Ronconi, 2010; Murillo et al., 2011; Ronconi, 2012). These variables are the fiscal result 
as a percentage of total incomes, the logarithm of the amount of per capita money lent by the 
banking system to the private sector, the logarithm of the per capita MWh of electricity 
consumed, the regional unemployment rate, the logarithm of the average per capita household 
income, the share of poor households receiving food programs, the Gini coefficient of the per 
capita household income, and the share of precarious dwellings. Finally, I also include as a 
16 
 
control variable the logarithm of the number of orientation actions per hundred salaried workers 
in each region and year.
18
  
 
                     
 
                     . (1) 
 
The model includes region and year fixed effects (   and    in equation (1) respectively). The 
standard errors are clustered at the region level.
19
  
The parameters of interest in equation (1) are   , where s denotes micro, small and large. 
There are reasons to believe that     is potentially correlated with the error term. The first one is 
a reverse causality argument. A low level of compliance with labor market regulation can result 
in a higher level of enforcement. The second one is an omitted variables argument. The 
enforcement level can be correlated with unobserved institutional and development time-varying 
characteristics at the region level (not captured by the region fixed effects), generating a spurious 
correlation with the compliance with labor market regulations. Considering the possible 
endogeneity of the enforcement measure in equation (1), I implement an instrumental variable 
strategy. The proposed instrument is a measure of the arrival cost faced by labor inspectors. 
Labor inspectors travel by car or using public transportation from a regional agency in region r to 
the firms to be inspected in some location of region r. The extension of the road network in 
region r provides a measure of the arrival cost to the firms. With a wider network, a higher 
geographic dispersion of firms is expected, increasing the arrival cost in terms of money and 
time. The arrival cost is also affected by the traffic in the road network in each region. A larger 
number of vehicles is expected to increase the transportation cost as well. The instrumental 
variable is defined as follows: 
 
                 . (2) 
 
The variable      is the extension of the region road network (national plus regional roads) in 
kilometers divided by the region territory. This variable differs greatly across regions, but the 
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 The Data Appendix provides details on variables definitions and sources of data. 
19
 I estimate linear models as they capture an average effect of economic interest avoiding interpretation problems 
arising from a non-linear second stage (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). 
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variation over time is small. The variable     measures the number of per capita crossing 
vehicles in the road network in region r and year t. The arrival cost is defined as the logarithm of 
the number of per capita crossing vehicles per kilometer of the ratio territory–region road 
network. If the extension of the road network and the traffic capture the regional development 
level, that will imply a violation to the exclusion restriction of the instrument. However, I expect 
to be capturing the development level with the region fixed effects and with the regional 
regressors with variation over time.
20
  
Table 1 provides de first stage results for different specifications using     and its interaction 
with indicator variables of firm size as instruments for the enforcement measure     and its 
interaction with indicators of firm size. Column (1) controls for all the individual characteristics 
in      and for some of the regional variables (fiscal result, logarithm of the per capita credit to 
the private sector, logarithm of the average per capita income, share of poor households 
receiving food programs, Gini coefficient of the per capita household income, and logarithm of 
orientation actions per hundred workers) –specification (1) from here onwards. Column (2) 
includes all the previous controls and adds some business cycle and development variables at the 
regional level. They are the logarithm of the per capita MWh of electricity consumed, the 
regional unemployment rate, and the share of precarious dwellings –specification (2) from here 
on.  
The measure of the arrival cost of labor inspectors is statistically significant at 1% level in 
the two proposed specifications, and the estimates are stable across models. As expected, an 
increase in the measure of arrival cost reduces the degree of enforcement. Specifically, a rise of 
1% in the arrival cost reduces the enforcement in around 0.16-0.18% regardless the size of the 
firm. Considering, for instance, the average annual change in the regional cost of arrival measure 
(8.34%), this relationship turns into a reduction of the enforcement level of around 1.33%-
1.50%.  
 
6. Results 
6.1 Changes in the enforcement measure and compliance by firm size 
                                                          
20
 Regional inspection agencies are based in the main cities of each region (e.g. capital city) where a large share of 
firms is expected to be located. A measure of the geographic dispersion of firms in each region’s territory would 
improve the instrument as an arrival cost measure. However, the lack of that information does not affect the validity 
of the instrument. 
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Table 2 shows the estimates of the effect of the enforcement measure on the compliance with the 
enrolment into the pension system, minimum wage, maximum weekly hours of work, and labor 
contract. As explained in Section 4, different forces are expected to be at play. First, more 
enforcement should increase the compliance level through a deterrence effect. Second, small and 
large firms may decide to adjust their size to become micro and small respectively in order to 
enjoy lower fines and/or more flexible regulations. Third, workers who become unemployed in 
the adjustment process may find a job in the informal sector of the economy which is not 
inspected. 
Panel 1 shows the results for the compliance with the enrolment into the pension system. 
Column (1) presents the average result without allowing the effect to differ by firm size. The 
estimated coefficient is very small in magnitude and not significant statistically. When the model 
includes interactions with indicator variables for the size of the firm where a worker is employed 
(columns (2) and (3) for the two specifications described above), there is a negative effect on 
large firms although not significant. In small firms the share of workers enrolled into the pension 
system falls with a higher level of enforcement in comparison to large firms in both 
specifications (effect significant at 10% level). Thus, the total effect is negative for small firms 
although significant in specification (1) only. Specifically, a 10% increase in the enforcement 
measure reduces the rate of enrolment into the pension system by 3.3 percentage points in small 
firms. For micro firms, both the differential effect with respect to large firms and the total effect 
are positive but not significant. The last column shows OLS estimates using specification (2) for 
comparative purposes. The effects go in the same direction than IV estimates, but they are 
smaller in absolute value. 
Panel 2 of Table 2 shows the effects of the enforcement measure on the compliance with the 
minimum wage regulation. There is a general increase when the model doesn’t distinguish by 
size of the firm (column (1)). The next two columns show that a rise in the enforcement measure 
leads to higher shares of workers earning the minimum wage in large and small firms. The effect 
is approximately 3 percentage points for each 10% increase in the level of enforcement. The 
effect in micro firms is zero statistically.  
Estimates of the impact of the enforcement measure on the share of employees working no 
more than the legal maximum of weekly hours appear in panel 3 of Table 2 and show no effect at 
all. The estimated coefficients are very small and not significant in statistically terms.  
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Finally, panel 4 in Table 2 presents the effect on the compliance with the labor contract 
regulation. The effects are zero statistically, except for an increase in the share of employees 
with a labor contract in micro firms (significant at 10% level using specification (2)). The effect 
indicates an increase of 2 percentage points in the share of workers covered by this regulation in 
micro firms for each 10% increase in the degree of enforcement. 
In summary, few statistically significant effects of the degree of enforcement on the 
compliance with labor regulations were found. This could be indicating the lack of effectiveness 
of the labor inspection system or the effect of forces operating in opposite directions. As pointed 
out before, firms make decisions considering all the incentives arising from a change in the 
degree of enforcement, and these incentives could go in different directions and differ depending 
on the size of the firms. According to the results obtained here for Peru, in large firms the share 
of workers earning the minimum wage increased, but no change was observed for other 
regulations. For workers employed in firms of small size, there was a rise in the share receiving 
the minimum wage and a reduction in the share enrolled into the pension system (although this 
effect was not robust to the inclusion of additional regressors), with no change in the remaining 
labor rules. Finally, in micro firms the share of workers with a labor contract increased, with no 
change in the other labor benefits analyzed. The few effects identified were mainly in the 
direction of increasing the level of compliance, indicating that at least for these few cases the 
deterrence effect of labor inspections jointly to any positive impact of the size thresholds effect 
dominated over the movement into the informal sector effect and any negative impact of the 
effect of firms crossing the size thresholds. For the remaining labor regulations, these positive 
and negative forces (if any) offset each other leading to null effects. 
 
6.2 Separating the effect of firms crossing the size thresholds  
The next step is to try to disentangle the effect generated by firms crossing the size thresholds 
from the estimates obtained in the previous sub-section. In the absence of firm level data, I 
calculated the shares of workers employed in firms of a size right above the thresholds in each 
region, economic sector and year.
21
 I expect these shares to represent the mass of workers who 
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 There is an extensive literature on the bunching effect generated by size dependent regulations using firm level 
data (for instance, Chetty et al., 2011). The estimations in this sub-section are not an attempt to identify such effect, 
but to control for any possible re-assignment of workers from one side of a size threshold to the other side as a 
consequence of a change in the enforcement level.  
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can potentially move from being in a small firm to be in a micro firm, and from being in a large 
firm to be in a small one. Then, I included as control variables the interaction between the share 
of workers above the size threshold for micro firms (10 employees) and indicator variables for 
micro and small firms, and the interaction between the share of workers above the size threshold 
for small firms (100 employees) and indicator variables for small and large firms. The reasoning 
is that the movement of firms from the right to left of a size threshold as a response to a higher 
degree of enforcement can have an impact on the compliance level at both sides of the threshold.  
Table 3 shows the results obtained using specification (2) and three different definitions of 
workers who can potentially cross the size thresholds: the share of workers in firms that surpass 
the size thresholds by 25%, 50% and 75%.
22
 The estimates for the enrolment into the pension 
system appear in panel 1 and show qualitatively similar results than before: a reduction in the 
share of enrolled workers in small firms compared to large firms, but no significant effect for the 
aggregate of small firms. The comparison of this statistically significant coefficient with 
previous estimates in Tables 2 reveals a small increase of the effect in the model that uses the 
25% definition, and a small reduction in the 50% and 75% models. Results for the minimum 
wage regulation show an increase in the share of workers earning the minimum wage in large 
and small firms (Panel 2 of Table 3). The magnitude of the effects are similar than before in the 
model that controls for the share of workers in firms surpassing the size thresholds by 25%, and 
lower when that percentage is 50% and 75%. Estimates for the compliance with the maximum 
weekly hours of work show again no statistically significant effect (Panel 3 of Table 3). Finally, 
the previous increase in the share of workers in micro firms having a labor contract disappears 
when the model controls for the size thresholds effect (Panel 4 of Table 3). In the models that use 
the 50% and 75% definitions, the effect is close to be significant at 10% level and the magnitude 
smaller than in previous estimations in Table 2. 
In summary, this sub-section has shown that only a small part of the few impacts identified in 
the previous sub-section was explained by the size thresholds effect. The generally smaller 
magnitude of the effects found in this sub-section indicates that the decision of firms to change 
their size to enjoy lower fines and/or more flexible regulations leads to increases in the 
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 For instance, for the share of workers in firms that surpass the size threshold by 50%, I calculated the shares of 
workers in firms between 11 and 15 employees (50% above the size threshold of 10 employees for micro firms) and 
the share of workers in firms between 101 and 150 employees (50% above the size threshold of 100 employees for 
small firms). 
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compliance with the rules. The remaining positive impacts on the share of workers covered by 
labor market benefits (minimum wage in large and small firms) should be explained by the 
dominance of the deterrence effect of labor inspections over the movement of laid off workers to 
the informal sector of the economy.  
 
6.3 Additional estimations 
In order to obtain further confirmation of previous findings, I run two additional set of 
regressions. The first one excludes the rural area from the sample. Section 3 pointed out that the 
rural area has received labor inspections during the period analyzed, but inspection activities are 
mainly focused on urban areas due to the scarcity of resources. Under these conditions, it is 
possible that businesses located in the rural area do not perceive any change in the probability of 
being inspected when the percentage of inspections per hundred workers changes, fading away 
the effect of the enforcement measure. 
 The results obtained when restricting the sample to urban observations appear in Table 4. For 
each of the outcome variables, column (1) shows the instrumental variables estimates using 
specification (2), while column (2) also controls for the size thresholds effect using the share of 
workers in firms surpassing the size thresholds by 50%. The share of workers enrolled into the 
pension system falls for urban workers in large firms when the degree of enforcement increases 
(effect significant at 10% level). This effect disappears when the model controls for the effect of 
firms crossing the size thresholds. In small firms, the share of workers enrolled into the pension 
system falls in both models and the reduction is larger when the size thresholds effect is not 
controlled for (column (1)). There is no change for workers in micro firms. As in previous 
estimates, the shares of workers earning the minimum wage increase in small and large firms. 
For large firms, the impact is larger when the size thresholds effect is included as part of the 
main effect (column (1)), but the opposite occurs for small firms. There is no significant effect 
on the share of workers covered by the legal maximum of weekly hours, while the share of 
workers with a labor contract increases in micro firms when the model controls for the size 
thresholds effect (column (2)).   
 The second set of estimations uses a different definition for the instrument. The instrumental 
variable used so far was proportional to the extension of the road network and the traffic in each 
region and year. This measure could be overestimating the arrival cost in regions having more 
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than one inspection agency in its territory –i.e. I am assuming that each agency covers certain 
geographic area of the region. To capture this aspect of labor inspections, I redefine the 
instrumental variables dividing the previous definition by the number of inspection agencies in 
each region.
23
 
 The results obtained with the new definition of the instrumental variable appear in Table 5 
where column (1) shows the instrumental variables estimates using specification (2), and column 
(2) also controls for the size thresholds effect using the 50% definition. The share of workers 
who are enrolled into the pension system falls in small firms with respect to large firms when the 
degree of enforcement increases. That is true in both models, but no effect is found for the 
aggregate of small firms. The effect is also nil for large and micro firms. The share of workers 
earning the minimum wage increases in large firms, but not in small firms. The magnitude of the 
effect for large firms is similar in both models. No effect appears for workers in micro firms. 
Finally, the shares of workers with labor contract and working no more than the legal maximum 
of weekly hours are not affected by the degree of enforcement regardless the size of the firm. 
 In summary, this sub-section has shown that different adjustment patterns seem to be at work 
in urban and rural areas. First, the share of workers enrolled into the pension system falls in large 
and small firms in the urban area when the enforcement level increases. This reduction in the 
compliance level was not significant statistically when the sample also included the rural area. 
Second, the size thresholds effect operates reducing the compliance level in urban areas, while it 
works in the increasing direction when the rural area was included. The remaining evidence 
obtained in this sub-section has indicated that the increased compliance with the minimum wage 
in large firms is robust to the new definition of the instrument, but not the increase in the share of 
workers in small firms earning the minimum wage and the share of workers with labor contract 
in micro firms.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
This paper has analyzed how changes in the enforcement of labor regulations affect the 
compliance rate in a context where the labor rules and the characteristics of the labor inspection 
system differ by firm size. This allowed adding to the analysis a margin of adjustment not 
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 The new instrument is defined as                      , where    denotes the number of inspection 
agencies in each region. 
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covered by previous literature –firms deciding to cross a size threshold to enjoy lower fines 
and/or less stringent labor regulations. 
The theoretical discussion indicated that firms make decisions considering all the incentives 
arising from a change in the degree of enforcement, and these incentives could go in opposite 
directions and be different depending on the size of the firms. First, the deterrence effect of labor 
inspections should lead to increases in the compliance level when there is a rise in the 
enforcement effort due to the firms’ perception of a higher probability of being inspected and 
fined. Second, the increase in labor costs due to a higher compliance level may lead some firms 
to reduce the size of their labor force. Displaced workers may offer their hours of work in the 
informal sector resulting in a reduction in the compliance rate. Third, less stringent regulations 
and lower monetary fines for firms of micro and small size generate incentives for small and 
large firms to become micro and small respectively when the degree of enforcement increases. 
Depending on the labor regulation considered, the size thresholds effect may lead to increases or 
reductions in the compliance level.   
The empirical analysis used Peruvian household survey data for the period 2008-2013 to 
identify how changes in an enforcement measure with variation at the regional and time level 
(logarithm of inspections per hundred salaried workers) impact on the compliance with four 
labor regulations (minimum wage, enrolment into the pension system, labor contract, and 
maximum weekly hours of work) differentiating by firm size. The results obtained using an 
instrumental variable strategy -being the instrument a measure of the arrival cost of inspectors to 
the firms- revealed that the enforcement effort had little impact on the compliance with labor 
market regulations.  
The few statistically significant effects found differ by firm size and also by geographic area. 
The most robust finding was an increase in the shares of workers earning the minimum wage in 
small and large firms. These results were robust to the restriction of the sample to urban 
observations and also to the definition of the instrument in the case of workers employed in large 
firms. There was an increase in the share of workers in micro firms having a labor contract as a 
result of an increase in the level of enforcement. This result appeared using the whole sample 
and the sample restricted to the urban area, but was statistically weak and not robust to the 
change in the instrument. When the sample was restricted to the urban area, a reduction in the 
shares of workers enrolled into the pension system in small and large firms appeared, indicating 
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different adjustment patterns in urban and rural areas. Finally, no effect was found for the 
compliance with the maximum hours of work in any of the specifications and samples used 
regardless the size of the firm where workers are employed.  
The main contribution of this paper was to bring into consideration a margin of adjustment 
not analyzed before. When faced with a higher degree of enforcement, firms may decide to 
reduce its size in order to enjoy lower fines and/or more flexible labor regulations. This is 
possible in Peru where the monetary penalties for violating the labor rules and the stringency of 
labor regulations are lower the lower the size of the firms. The results revealed that the size 
thresholds effect was small in magnitude and it was not clear in which direction operated. It 
increased the compliance with the rules in some cases –minimum wage in small and large firms 
using the whole sample, and it reduced it in some others –enrolment into the pension system in 
small and large firms using the urban sample. 
All in all, the enforcement of labor market regulations had little impact on the compliance 
level in Peru over the period 2008-2013. In the few cases were significant effects were found, the 
deterrence effect of labor inspections was strong enough to generate increases in the compliance 
with labor market regulations sometimes -minimum wage in small and large firms-, but was 
offset by the movement of displaced workers into the informal sector some other times -
enrolment into the pension system in small firms of urban areas. The simultaneous increase and 
reduction in the compliance with the labor rules is compatible with the evidence showing that 
most salaried workers in Peru enjoy some labor benefits but not all of them, meaning that firms 
do not restrict their choices to comply with all the labor regulations or to not comply with any of 
them.  
The general lack of effect of the enforcement measure on the compliance with the labor rules 
leads to the conclusion that the Peruvian labor inspection system was not effective during the 
period analyzed, either because it was not able to generate the incentives to comply with labor 
regulations (e.g. because resources were scarce, fines were too low, and/or labor inspectors 
turned a blind eye on violations to the rules) or because it failed to overcome the consequences 
of the adjustment process associated to an increase in the compliance level (e.g. displaced 
workers moving into the informal sector of the economy). 
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Table 1: Enforcement of labor market regulations and arrival cost of labor inspectors 
 
Notes: OLS estimations. Standard errors clustered at the region level between brackets and p-value for the test of 
significance of the linear combination of coefficients between parentheses. Individual controls include sex, age and 
age squared, educational level, civil status, number of children at home, race, area, size of the firm and sector of 
activity. The set of regional controls 1 includes the number of orientation orders per hundred workers, fiscal result, 
credit to the private sector, per capita household income, beneficiaries or food programs, and inequality index. The 
set of regional controls 2 adds unemployment rate, electricity consumption, and precarious dwellings. See Data 
Appendix for sources and definitions of variables. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Log(arrival cost) -0.157 -0.174 -0.0552 -0.0679 -0.0182 -0.0223
[0.0385]*** [0.0437]*** [0.0292]* [0.0331]* [0.0134] [0.0154]
Log(arrival cost)*IMICRO -0.000665 -0.000779 -0.0483 -0.0482 -0.0112 -0.0113
[0.00151] [0.00157] [0.0332] [0.0331] [0.00349]*** [0.00346]***
Log(arrival cost)*ISMALL -0.00440 -0.00448 -0.00955 -0.00958 -0.0582 -0.0582
[0.00254]* [0.00255]* [0.00348]** [0.00354]** [0.0300]* [0.0301]*
Effect on Micro firms -0.158 -0.175 -0.104 -0.116 -0.029 -0.034
(0)*** (0)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.028)** (0.028)**
Effect on Small firms -0.161 -0.178 -0.065 -0.077 -0.076 -0.081
(0)*** (0)*** (0.035)** (0.026)** (0.009)*** (0.007)***
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls 2 No Yes No Yes No Yes
Region and Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345
R
2
0.820 0.825 0.821 0.825 0.499 0.503
Log(enforcement) Log(enforcement)*IMICRO Log(enforcement)*ISMALL
28 
 
Table 2: Compliance by firm size and enforcement of labor regulations  
 
 
 
  
Dependent variable:
IV (1) IV (2) IV (3) OLS IV (1) IV (2) IV (3) OLS
Log(enforcement measure) -0.0202 -0.211 -0.170 -0.0118 0.125 0.326 0.336 -0.00939
[0.0359] [0.160] [0.168] [0.0240] [0.0237]*** [0.165]** [0.163]** [0.0251]
Log(enforcement measure)*IMICRO 0.316 0.315 0.0157 -0.367 -0.361 0.00477
[0.287] [0.288] [0.0286] [0.284] [0.283] [0.0324]
Log(enforcement measure)*ISMALL -0.119 -0.122 -0.0139 -0.0146 -0.0166 0.0368
[0.0678]* [0.0671]* [0.0295] [0.0784] [0.0778] [0.0245]
Effect on Micro firms 0.1050 0.1450 0.0039 -0.0410 -0.0250 -0.0046
(0.442) (0.264) (0.797) (0.749) (0.835) (0.8)
Effect on Small firms -0.3300 -0.2920 -0.0257 0.3114 0.3194 0.0274
(0.056)* (0.11) (0.205) (0.073)* (0.059)* (0.095)*
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls 2 Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region and Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345
R
2
0.398 0.384 0.385 0.398 0.212 0.199 0.199 0.213
Panel 1 Panel 2
 =1 if worker receives pension contributions =1 if worker earns the minimum wage
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Table 2 (cont.): Compliance by firm size and enforcement of labor regulations 
 
Notes: OLS and IV estimations. The instrument is the logarithm of the per capita crossing vehicles per kilometer of regional roads. Standard errors clustered at 
the region level between brackets and p-value for the test of significance of the linear combination of coefficients between parentheses. Individual controls 
include sex, age and age squared, educational level, civil status, number of children at home, race, area, size of the firm and sector of activity. The set of regional 
controls 1 includes the number of orientation orders per hundred workers, fiscal result, credit to the private sector, per capita household income, beneficiaries or 
food programs, and inequality index. The set of regional controls 2 adds unemployment rate, electricity consumption, and precarious dwellings. See Data 
Appendix for sources and definitions of variables. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Dependent variable:
IV (1) IV (2) IV (3) OLS IV (1) IV (2) IV (3) OLS
Log(enforcement measure) -0.0284 0.0311 0.0364 -0.0234 0.0436 -0.129 -0.112 0.00441
[0.0401] [0.100] [0.101] [0.0273] [0.0310] [0.181] [0.185] [0.0238]
Log(enforcement measure)*IMICRO -0.0573 -0.0582 -0.00705 0.316 0.313 0.000399
[0.164] [0.164] [0.0272] [0.296] [0.295] [0.0238]
Log(enforcement measure)*ISMALL -0.128 -0.129 0.0242 -0.0926 -0.0949 -0.0299
[0.0989] [0.0994] [0.0251] [0.111] [0.109] [0.0363]
Effect on Micro firms -0.0262 -0.0218 -0.0305 0.1870 0.2010 0.0048
(0.781) (0.807) (0.06)* (0.133) (0.09)* (0.734)
Effect on Small firms -0.0969 -0.0926 0.0008 -0.2216 -0.2069 -0.0255
(0.323) (0.349) (0.938) (0.132) (0.179) (0.352)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls 2 Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region and Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345
R
2
0.029 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.479 0.466 0.466 0.479
Panel 3 Panel 4
=1 if worker works the max. weekly hours or less =1 if worker has a labor contract
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Table 3: Compliance by firm size and enforcement of labor regulations. Controlling for the size thresholds effect 
 
 
 
  
Dependent variable:
25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
Log(enforcement measure) -0.154 -0.139 -0.130 0.336 0.297 0.289
[0.185] [0.155] [0.151] [0.163]** [0.150]** [0.142]**
Log(enforcement measure)*IMICRO 0.297 0.265 0.251 -0.361 -0.321 -0.302
[0.315] [0.258] [0.243] [0.283] [0.262] [0.244]
Log(enforcement measure)*ISMALL -0.139 -0.119 -0.106 -0.0166 -0.00325 -0.000564
[0.0627]** [0.0523]** [0.0496]** [0.0778] [0.0773] [0.0740]
0 0 0 0
Effect on Micro firms 0.1430 0.1260 0.1210 -0.0250 -0.0240 -0.0130
(0.305) (0.268) (0.256) (0.796) (0.836) (0.901)
Effect on Small firms -0.2930 -0.2580 -0.2360 0.3194 0.2938 0.2884
(0.158) (0.131) (0.132) (0.068)* (0.063)* (0.054)*
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region and Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345
R
2
0.385 0.389 0.391 0.199 0.202 0.204
=1 if worker earns the minimum wage=1 if worker receives pension contributions
Panel 2Panel 1
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Table 3 (cont.): Compliance by firm size and enforcement of labor regulations. Controlling for the size thresholds effect 
 
Notes: IV estimations. The instrument is the logarithm of the per capita crossing vehicles per kilometer of regional roads. Standard errors clustered at the region 
level between brackets and p-value for the test of significance of the linear combination of coefficients between parentheses. Individual controls include sex, age 
and age squared, educational level, civil status, number of children at home, race, area, size of the firm and sector of activity. The set of regional controls 1 
includes the number of orientation orders per hundred workers, fiscal result, credit to the private sector, per capita household income, beneficiaries or food 
programs, and inequality index. The set of regional controls 2 adds unemployment rate, electricity consumption, and precarious dwellings. See Data Appendix 
for sources and definitions of variables. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
  
Dependent variable:
25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
Log(enforcement measure) 0.0562 0.0746 0.0899 -0.149 -0.127 -0.124
[0.130] [0.123] [0.128] [0.229] [0.197] [0.194]
Log(enforcement measure)*IMICRO -0.0854 -0.114 -0.136 0.342 0.306 0.294
[0.192] [0.174] [0.177] [0.352] [0.299] [0.285]
Log(enforcement measure)*ISMALL -0.148 -0.152 -0.162 -0.0394 -0.0298 -0.00846
[0.143] [0.145] [0.147] [0.124] [0.110] [0.116]
Effect on Micro firms -0.0292 -0.0394 -0.0461 0.1930 0.1790 0.1700
(0.747) (0.61) (0.556) (0.146) (0.107) (0.102)
Effect on Small firms -0.0918 -0.0774 -0.0721 -0.1884 -0.1568 -0.1325
(0.41) (0.389) (0.425) (0.232) (0.233) (0.244)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region and Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345
R
2
0.028 0.028 0.027 0.468 0.471 0.472
=1 if worker works the max. weekly hours or less =1 if worker has a labor contract
Panel 3 Panel 4
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Table 4: Compliance by firm size and enforcement of labor regulations. Urban area 
 
Notes: IV estimations. The instrument is the logarithm of the per capita crossing vehicles per kilometer of regional roads. Standard errors clustered at the region 
level between brackets and p-value for the test of significance of the linear combination of coefficients between parentheses. Individual controls include sex, age 
and age squared, educational level, civil status, number of children at home, race, area, size of the firm and sector of activity. The set of regional controls 1 
includes the number of orientation orders per hundred workers, fiscal result, credit to the private sector, per capita household income, beneficiaries or food 
programs, and inequality index. The set of regional controls 2 adds unemployment rate, electricity consumption, and precarious dwellings. See Data Appendix 
for sources and definitions of variables. The size thresholds effect used the definition of the 50%. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 
10%.
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Log(enforcement measure) -0.252 -0.144 0.266 0.254 0.0257 0.0561 -0.105 -0.0920
[0.144]* [0.132] [0.142]* [0.128]** [0.0939] [0.120] [0.155] [0.169]
Log(enforcement measure)*IMICRO 0.236 0.206 -0.313 -0.278 -0.0861 -0.151 0.266 0.259
[0.215] [0.202] [0.240] [0.226] [0.146] [0.166] [0.243] [0.247]
Log(enforcement measure)*ISMALL -0.0832 -0.0903 -0.00842 0.0134 -0.113 -0.124 -0.0533 -0.00654
[0.0657] [0.0533]* [0.0709] [0.0746] [0.0808] [0.118] [0.116] [0.121]
0 0
Effect on Micro firms -0.0160 0.0620 -0.0470 -0.0240 -0.0604 -0.0949 0.1610 0.1670
(0.894) (0.528) (0.743) (0.819) (0.531) (0.213) (0.105) (0.076)*
Effect on Small firms -0.3352 -0.2343 0.2576 0.2674 -0.0873 -0.0679 -0.1583 -0.0985
(0.008)*** (0.046)** (0.085)* (0.06)* (0.219) (0.233) (0.128) (0.291)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms crossing thresholdseffect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Region and Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44,098 44,098 44,098 44,098 44,098 44,098 44,098 44,098
R
2
0.380 0.383 0.192 0.195 0.030 0.030 0.465 0.467
=1 if worker has a labor 
contract
 =1 if worker receives 
pension contributions
=1 if worker earns the 
minimum wage
=1 if worker works the max. 
weekly hours or less
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Table 5: Compliance by firm size and enforcement of labor regulations. Change in the definition of the instrument 
 
Notes: IV estimations. The instrument is the logarithm of the per capita crossing vehicles per kilometer of regional roads divided by the number of regional 
inspection agencies. Standard errors clustered at the region level between brackets and p-value for the test of significance of the linear combination of 
coefficients between parentheses. Individual controls include sex, age and age squared, educational level, civil status, number of children at home, race, area, size 
of the firm and sector of activity. The set of regional controls 1 includes the number of orientation orders per hundred workers, fiscal result, credit to the private 
sector, per capita household income, beneficiaries or food programs, and inequality index. The set of regional controls 2 adds unemployment rate, electricity 
consumption, and precarious dwellings. See Data Appendix for sources and definitions of variables. The size thresholds effect used the definition of the 50%. 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Log(enforcement measure) -0.170 -0.0937 0.292 0.295 0.0832 0.0838 -0.0533 -0.0642
[0.138] [0.137] [0.158]* [0.150]** [0.0708] [0.0599] [0.115] [0.134]
Log(enforcement measure)*IMICRO 0.282 0.234 -0.436 -0.362 -0.0399 -0.0792 0.249 0.228
[0.292] [0.258] [0.293] [0.250] [0.110] [0.103] [0.245] [0.223]
Log(enforcement measure)*ISMALL -0.214 -0.181 -0.0536 -0.0386 -0.0851 -0.0806 -0.201 -0.101
[0.129]* [0.0988]* [0.0605] [0.0558] [0.0677] [0.0804] [0.126] [0.0844]
0 0
Effect on Micro firms 0.1120 0.1403 -0.1440 -0.0670 0.0433 0.0046 0.1957 0.1638
(0.532) (0.299) (0.396) (0.554) (0.552) (0.938) (0.168) (0.115)
Effect on Small firms -0.3840 -0.2747 0.2384 0.2564 -0.0019 0.0032 -0.2543 -0.1652
(0.111) (0.199) (0.18) (0.121) (0.986) (0.97) (0.195) (0.298)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms crossing thresholdseffect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Region and Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345 51,345
R
2
0.381 0.388 0.195 0.201 0.028 0.028 0.465 0.472
 =1 if worker receives 
pension contributions
=1 if worker earns the 
minimum wage
=1 if worker works the max. 
weekly hours or less
=1 if worker has a labor 
contract
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Figure 1: Compliance with labor market regulations by firm size. 2008-2013 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta Nacional de Hogares.
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Figure 2: Compliance with labor market regulations by region. 2008-2013 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta Nacional de Hogares. 
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Figure 3: Intensity of compliance with labor market regulations. 2008-2013 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Encuesta Nacional de Hogares.
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Figure 4: Inspections, violations to labor market regulations detected and penalties imposed. 
2008-2013 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del Empleo. 
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Figure 5: Annual changes in the enforcement measure across regions 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del Empleo. 
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Data Appendix 
Enforcement measure 
I collected information published by the Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del Empleo (Labor 
Ministry or MTPE) on the total number of annual inspections in each of the 25 regions from 
2008 to 2013. I generated a measure of enforcement defined as the logarithm of the ratio of 
inspections per hundred salaried workers in each region and year. The data covers the 24 regions 
of Peru and Callao (constitutional province). The region of Lima includes information on Lima 
Metropolitana (metropolitan province). Data from the MTPE also contains the number of 
guidance and orientation orders in each region and year. I use this information to construct a 
control variable. 
 Labor inspectors travel by car or using public transportation from the regional inspection 
agency to the firms to be inspected. The extension of the road network and the traffic in each 
region are measures of the inspection costs which I use to instrument the enforcement measure. 
Data on the extension of the national and regional road networks in each region and year was 
obtained from the Ministerio de Transporte y Comunicaciones. The extension of the road 
network is measured in kilometers and was normalized by the corresponding region’s territory, 
which data comes from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática. Information on the 
traffic in the road network of each region and year comes from the Ministerio de Transporte y 
Comunicaciones. The variable is measured in number of vehicles crossing regional tollbooths 
and was normalized by the population of each province using data from the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística e Informática. Some regions do not have tollbooths (Huancavelica, Loreto, Madre de 
Dios, Pasco, Ucayali and Callao). In those cases, I assigned the average value of crossing 
vehicles in neighboring regions. 
 
Worker level data 
I use the Peruvian household survey, Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) for the period 
2008-2013. The ENAHO contains information about working conditions and labor benefits. This 
data includes the annual labor income, the number of hours of work per week, contributions to 
the pension system, and having a labor contract. All the information is reported by workers. In 
order to construct indicator variables of compliance with labor market regulations, I divide the 
annual labor income in the main occupation by 12 and compare the monthly value with the 
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minimum wage. I use the minimum wage that was in force in the month and year each worker 
was interviewed. Data on the minimum wage comes from the MTPE. For the compliance with 
the legal maximum of weekly hours of work, I use information on the number of hours worked 
in the previous week in the main occupation.   
 Workers who do not receive the mandated benefits could be employed in a formal or an 
informal firm. The Peruvian household survey contains information regarding the legal entity of 
the firm where a worker is employed and the accounting system it uses (whether it is the 
accounting system required by the tax authority or not). This information is used in the literature 
to identify the formality status of employers and self-employed workers (Rodríguez and Higa, 
2010), but is not considered a good indicator of the formality status of the firm where a salaried 
worker is employed, as it is expected to capture that information with error. Thus, the effect of 
changes in the degree of enforcement on the compliance with labor market regulations will be 
reflecting the average impact on the formal and the informal sectors of the economy. 
 The ENAHO provides data on individual characteristics used as control variables in the 
empirical analysis. They are gender, age, indicator variables for educational levels, indicator 
variable of civil status, number of children under 14 years of age at home, indicator variables for 
race and urban area, and indicator variables for the economic sector and the size of the firm 
where each worker is employed. 
 
Regional data 
I use different sources of data to construct control variables with variation over time related to 
the political-business cycle and development level of each region. I use the primary result (total 
incomes – primary expenditures) as a political business cycle variable. This data was obtained 
from the Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, it was expressed in constant prices of 2005 and was 
normalized by the total incomes in each region. To control for regional economic cycles, I use 
several variables. First, the amount of money lent by the banking system to the private sector was 
obtained from the Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. This variable was expressed in constant 
prices of 2005, normalized by the regional population, and then expressed in logarithm. Second, 
the MWh of electricity consumed was also obtained from the Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. 
This variable was normalized by the population in each region and expressed in logarithm. Third, 
the regional unemployment rate was calculated from the ENAHO. Finally, the set of 
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development variables at the regional level includes: the logarithm of the average per capita 
household income expressed in constant prices of 2005 and calculated from the ENAHO, the 
number of households receiving food programs as a percentage of the total number of poor 
households was obtained from the Instituto de Estadística e Informática, the Gini coefficient of 
the per capita household income was calculated from the ENAHO, and the share of precarious 
dwellings was also obtained from the ENAHO and defined as the percentage of dwellings 
located in a shanty town (“vivienda en villa”) or households living in inconvenient places.  
